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The aim of the paper is to compare the macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal rules that
can be applied in the context of the future full participation of Poland in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. The results of our analyses show that we observe the
smallest changes in the structural balance when ﬁscal policy is aimed at both GDP
stabilisation and business cycles synchronisation. Unfortunately, when we analyse the
characteristics of the ﬁscal rule we discover that the possibility of effective practical
application of such a rule is very limited. The reason for this may be the lack of
transparency and delays we face in publishing macroeconomic data, which is
indispensable for ﬁscal rule application.
Keywords: ﬁscal policy; ﬁscal rules; EMU; business cycles; synchronisation; budget
deﬁcit
JEL classiﬁcation: E32, E61, E62, H62
1. Introduction
Polish accession to the euro area will lead to fundamental changes in terms of the use
of macroeconomic policy. Following future full participation of Poland in the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) there will be no possibility to absorb asymmetric shocks
by means of the Polish monetary policy. This means that the most important tool of
economic stabilisation will be ﬁscal policy. It will be responsible not only for mitigating
ﬂuctuations of economic activity but also will become the only available instrument for
improving the level of business cycle synchronisation between Poland and the euro area.
The importance of such synchronisation is one of the principles of optimum currency
area theory (see, for example, Frankel & Rose, 1998; Piłat, 2011). However, the ﬁscal
rules binding in Poland as a member of the European Union and future member of
Eurozone, that is the Stability and Growth Pact and Fiscal Compact,1 do not take into
account the synchronisation of business cycles.
Fiscal rules that would be optimal from the point of view of mitigating economic
ﬂuctuations are nowadays a popular subject of numerous studies in the economic litera-
ture (see, for example, Benigno & Woodford, 2003; Mackiewicz, 2007). However, there
is a lack of research concerning ﬁscal policy that is optimal from the point of view of
business cycle synchronisation.
The purpose of this article is to compare the ﬁscal rule, for which the optimality
criterion is the convergence of business cycles in Poland and the euro area, with the rule
aimed at eliminating economic ﬂuctuations in Poland. This problem seems to be of great
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importance, especially after Polish accession to the euro area. Thus, one of the
fundamental tasks of ﬁscal policy will be to increase the level of synchronisation of
ﬂuctuations in Poland to the ﬂuctuations observed in the Eurozone as a whole.
2. The use of rules in ﬁscal policy
The problem of applying the rules in economic policy, and also ﬁscal policy rules, has
been present in the literature since the 1940s, when Milton Friedman drew attention to
some imperfections of a policy conducted in a discretionary manner. Buchanan and
Wagner (1977) argued that it is crucial to introduce a rule-based ﬁscal policy because
politicians tend to increase a budget deﬁcit, which is – according to these authors –
typical for democracy. The issue of applying the rules was incorporated into the theo-
retical research programme on a wider scale in the 1970s in the context of the problem
of time inconsistency (Kydland & Prescott, 1977). From that time until the 1990s, the
main interest of researchers focused on monetary policy rules, in particular on the
Taylor (1993) rule (see Taylor, 2000).
The establishment of the EMU was the starting point of the debate about the role of
rules in shaping ﬁscal policy. Buiter and Grafe (2002) present a comprehensive review
of the reasons for the application of the rules in the EMU. According to the authors, the
main argument in favour of introducing ﬁscal rules is the existence of externalities,
which cause the costs of the decisions made by one country to be partly transferred to
other countries. In the case of full independence (when the union does not exist), if any
country conducts a policy that is perceived by ﬁnancial markets to be irresponsible, it
usually leads to an increase in the risk premium, which burdens the debt instruments of
this country. Then, if the ﬁscal policy is not adjusted, the reaction of the market is the
introduction of credit rationing. This means state insolvency and eventually it forces the
government to tighten ﬁscal policy.
The existence of strong economic ties in the union may, however, result in such a
situation that all its Member States are interested in avoiding the insolvency of any
member of the union. The losses incurred by investors in one country could have nega-
tive effects on the remaining states of the union. The contagion effects may be another
mechanism of propagation of adverse developments caused by the insolvency. In this
way, the effects of irresponsible ﬁscal policy are partly passed on to other states, which
gives rise to moral hazard and can lead to an excessive deﬁcit.
The application of ﬁscal rules in the euro area is desirable not only because of the
fact that some states tend to have excessive debt, but also due to the fact that they can
act as instruments of counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy. It is especially important in the
monetary union. However, empirical studies reveal that, contrary to the normative the-
ory, ﬁscal policy is often pro-cyclical. Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, and Talvif (1996) were
the ﬁrst to observe that in some South American countries limited access to capital mar-
kets was the cause of pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy. Catão and Sutton (2002) obtained simi-
lar results for a bigger group of less developed countries. Talvi and Vegh (2005)
pointed out that whereas ﬁscal policy in the countries of the G7 is strongly counter-
cyclical, in developing countries it tends to be pro-cyclical. Similar results were
achieved by Lane (2003), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Bogdanov (2010). On the
other hand, Staehr (2008) obtained that, on average, ﬁscal policy in Central European
Countries was more counter-cyclical than in the Eurozone countries.
The analyses concerning cyclicality of ﬁscal policy have been of special importance
since the beginning of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. On the one hand, empirical results
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indicate that during the crisis ﬁscal multipliers are signiﬁcantly higher (see Auerbach &
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Baum & Koester, 2011) and many countries introduced large
stimulus packages leading to counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy. On the other hand, some
countries with high public debt introduced austerity plans, in order to avoid insolvency
and because of the negative impact of high public debt on ﬁnancial markets (see for
example Gajewski, 2014). As a result, austerity plans led to a pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy
and, because of high ﬁscal multipliers, decreased GDP growth more than was predicted
(see Blanchard & Leigh, 2013).
3. The construction of theoretical ﬁscal rule
From a macroeconomic point of view, a key criterion for the selection of a good ﬁscal
rule is its compatibility with the established ﬁscal policy. In the context of Poland’s
future accession to the Eurozone, two possible criteria for ﬁscal policy optimisation
were analysed in this paper:
- output gap reduction in Poland,
- synchronisation of economic ﬂuctuations in Poland and the euro area.
Minimising the output gap is one of the standard objectives of ﬁscal policy (see
Benigno & Woodford, 2003). At the same time, after Poland’s accession to the euro
area, due to the change in the role of monetary policy, the role of ﬁscal policy as a tool
for eliminating asymmetric shocks will increase. Moreover, ﬁscal policy can have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the degree of synchronisation of economic ﬂuctuations. For these rea-
sons, in this study, we examined the shape of ﬁscal policy aimed at both reduction of
the output gap in Poland and increasing the level of synchronisation of economic
ﬂuctuations in Poland and the euro area.
Let us assume the following loss function (L):
L ¼ a~y2 þ ð1 aÞ ~y ~yeð Þ2 (1)
where: ~y – output gap in Poland, ~ye – output gap in the euro area, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The minimum of the loss function deﬁnes the optimal ﬁscal rule. The lower the
value of the parameter α, the more we concentrate on synchronisation of ﬂuctuations in
Poland and the euro area. For α = 0 ﬁscal policy is aimed only at neutralising asymmet-
ric shocks, while for α = it is aimed at reduction of economic ﬂuctuations, regardless of
whether they are the result of economic ﬂuctuations across the euro area or asymmetric
shocks in the Polish economy. Thus, in the ﬁrst case we assume that shocks occurring
across the whole union are neutralised by the common monetary policy, while in the
second case by ﬁscal policies of individual countries.
In the analysed model the instrument of ﬁscal policy is the structural balance of
public ﬁnances. Taking into account the presence of a relationship between ﬁscal policy
and economic ﬂuctuations2 we obtain:
~y ¼ ~y0  bB (2)
where: B is the balance of the general government sector,3 ~y0 is the output gap for
balanced budget, and β > 0.
The balance of the general government sector consists of structural and cyclical
components:4
B ¼ BS þ -B;Y~y (3)
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where: BS is the structural balance of the general government sector, ϖB,Y is the
marginal sensitivity of the budget balance with respect to the cycle, ϖB,Y ≥ 0.
From equations (2) and (3) we obtain:
~y ¼ ~y0  bB
S
1þ b-B;Y (4)
By substituting equation (4) into the loss function we get a formula:




þð1 aÞ ~y0  bB
S




We can obtain the following necessary condition of loss function minimisation:





The sufﬁcient condition of minimisation is satisﬁed due to the convexity of the loss
function.5
The optimal budget balance given by equation (6) depends on estimates of the
impact of ﬁscal policy on the Polish economy and the impact of economic ﬂuctuations
on public revenue and expenditure.6 These estimates were conducted on the basis of
Polish data covering the period 1995–2010.
The marginal sensitivity of the budget balance with respect to output depends on
output elasticities of public revenue and expenditure. Public revenues were decomposed
into the following categories: corporate income tax, indirect taxes, personal income tax
and social security contributions.
In the case of corporate income tax, indirect taxes and social security contributions,
progression does not occur. Thus, the average tax changes proportionally to the tax
base: θCIT,Y = θπ,Y, hIT ;Y ¼ CCþCG hIT ;Y ,7 θSSC,Y = θw,Y + θL,Y, where: θCIT,Y = output elastic-
ity of corporate income tax, θIT,Y = output elasticity of indirect tax, C = private con-
sumption, CG = public consumption, θSSC,Y = output elasticity of social security
contributions, θw,Y = output elasticity of wages, θL,Y = output elasticity of employment.
Personal income tax is a progressive tax. The greater the difference between mar-
ginal and average tax rates, the stronger the impact of ﬂuctuations in average wage on








hw;Y þ hL;Y (7)
where: θPIT,Y = output elasticity of PIT revenues, MTj = marginal tax rate for jth group
of taxpayers, ATj = average tax rate for the jth group of taxpayers, RPIT,j = the share of
tax revenues obtained from the jth group of taxpayers in total PIT revenues (see Giorno,
Richardson, Roseveare, & van den Noord, 1995).
Among public expenditures only those on unemployment beneﬁts are sensitive to
economic ﬂuctuations. The level of public spending on unemployment beneﬁts depends
on the number of unemployed and the average level of the beneﬁt per one unemployed
person. Under the assumption that the average beneﬁt per one unemployed person does
not change during the cycle and that the labour force does not respond to economic
ﬂuctuations we get: hUB;Y ¼  1uu hL;Y , where: θUB,Y is the output elasticity of
unemployment beneﬁt, and u is the unemployment rate.
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The ratios of marginal to average tax rate in PIT were calculated on the basis of
Polish Ministry of Finance annual data. The output elasticities of proﬁt, consumption,
employment, and wages were estimated on the basis of quarterly data from the Polish
Statistical Ofﬁce. Because we analysed short-term relationships, growth-rate equations
were applied.8 We obtained the following estimates:9 pt;i ¼ 0:007ð0:023Þ þ 1:188ð4:237Þ yt;i,
ct;i ¼ 0:010ð1:540Þ þ 0:705ð5:832Þ yt;i, Dlt;i ¼ 0:001ð0273Þ þ 0:346ð4:577Þ Dyt;i, wt;i ¼ 0:007ð1:060Þ þ 0:558ð4:033Þ yt;i where: πt,i,yt,
i,ct,i,lt,i,wt,i = growth rates of proﬁt, output, consumption, employment and wages
respectively, t = year, i = quarter.
As a result, we estimated that the marginal sensitivity of the budget balance with
respect to the cycle (ϖB,Y) is equal to 0.29.
The ﬁscal rule described by equation (6) depends not only on marginal sensitivities
of public expenditure and revenue with respect to the cycle, but also on the level of ﬁs-
cal multiplier (β). In order to guarantee the stationarity of variables and also due to the
fact that the short-term ﬁscal policy impact on GDP is analysed, the model was esti-
mated on ﬁrst differences. Apart from the ﬁscal policy variable (structural budget bal-
ance), exogenous variables were added which show the impact of the monetary system
and external macroeconomic situation on GDP. After removing the statistically





Dmt;i þ 0:011ð8:332Þ Dmt1;i þ 0:725ð8:281Þ DY
e
t;i where: Yt;i; Y
e
t;i = real GDP in Poland and euro
area respectively, and mt;i = real money supply.
Comparing our results with other studies we can notice that the ﬁscal multiplier in
the Polish economy is relatively low. As shown by Baum and Koester (2011) in most
studies, short-term ﬁscal multipliers in absolute terms are between 0.2 and 2.0 (see also
Afonso & Sousa, 2009; Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, & Kumhof, 2010).10
On the basis of the estimated parameters we can show that that the analysed ﬁscal
policy rule in the Polish economy is deﬁned by following equation:
BS ¼ 4:831~y0  5:121ð1 aÞ~ye (8)
Fiscal policy focused only on the synchronisation of the business cycle in Poland
and the euro area (i.e. for α = 1) would mean the appearance of considerable ﬂuctua-
tions of the structural balance of the general government sector, sometimes even
higher than 10% of GDP. Fiscal policy aimed only at eliminating ﬂuctuations in
Poland (for α = 0) would involve even larger changes in the level of ﬁscal policy
restrictiveness. What’s interesting during the analysed period is that relatively small
changes in the shape of the structural balance would be needed if ﬁscal policy was
to be aimed at eliminating both the ﬂuctuations and the synchronisation of the busi-
ness cycle in Poland and the euro. Such a ﬁscal policy, which is carried out in
accordance with the ﬁscal rule deﬁned by equation (8) for α = 0.5, is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The use of a ﬁscal rule (shown in Figure 1), in which we have both criteria of
optimality, that is the synchronisation of the business cycles and the reduction of
the output gap, would mean that after the accession to the Eurozone active ﬁscal
policy in Poland would, to a greater extent, be aimed at reducing asymmetric shocks
rather than minimising shocks occurring across the whole Economic and Monetary
Union.
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4. Conditions for rule efﬁciency
The ﬁscal rule should have a number of features that will support its use in practice. As
pointed out by Buiter (2003) the rules in different countries of the monetary union
should be conducted in such manner that it is consistent with the policy of the euro area
as a whole. It can be assumed that the analysed rule meets this condition. The ﬁscal pol-
icy conducted in accordance with the rule primarily reduces asymmetric shocks in par-
ticular countries, whereas the European Central Bank reduces the effects of common
shocks.
Kopits and Symansky (1998) made an attempt to create a more general list of fea-
tures of an efﬁcient ﬁscal rule. They conclude that the rule should be transparent, simple
and precisely deﬁned. Transparency is associated with a clear deﬁnition of the mecha-
nisms for the rule application and preventing ‘creative accounting’ by their reference to
the precise standards of budgetary accounting. The requirement of simplicity is similar
to the above criterion and makes it possible for the society to understand the rule and
be able to better monitor its compliance. A rule precisely deﬁned means the unambigu-
ous deﬁnition of an economic indicator that is the subject of the regulation.
Examining the ﬁscal rule presented in our study, it can be observed that it does not
fulﬁl the criterion of simplicity. It is difﬁcult to present the rule in such a way that it
would be clear and acceptable to the public and most policy-makers. Examining the rule
in terms of the other criteria we can see that on the one hand it relates precisely to eco-
nomic indicators, but on the other hand various options for calculating key values (e.g.
output gap and marginal sensitivity of budget balance with respect to the cycle) signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the transparency. Moreover, GDP data are published with a considerable
delay and the estimate of the output gap for the given year is changing with increasing
duration of the sample It additionally complicates the use of the rule.
One of conditions of the practical application of the ﬁscal rule is that its use does
not require frequent, rapid changes in the deﬁcit. The rule focused only on minimising



































































The seasonally adjusted balance of general government sector (% of GDP)
The structural balance optimal from the point of view of eliminating business cycles 
and synchronizing the cycle in Poland and euro area (% of GDP)
Figure 1. Fiscal policy in Poland aimed at both reducing the ﬂuctuations and synchronisation of
the business cycles.
Source: Based on data from the Central Statistical Ofﬁce and Eurostat.
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In conclusion, the analysed ﬁscal rule can be applied in the euro area; however, the
possibility of its practical application is limited for the following reasons.
- The rule lacks simplicity. The need to involve a complex statistical method makes
it difﬁcult to verify by the public whether the rule has been broken. In such a case
the rule lacks efﬁciency.
- The shape of the optimal rule depends on the methodology of calculating the
structural deﬁcit. It gives the ﬁscal authorities the possibility of adjusting the rule
to the current political objectives.
- To apply a ﬁscal rule we need to calculate the output gap, which can be problem-
atic because of the lags in publishing the indispensable statistical data.
5. Summary
Due to the Poland’s future accession to the Eurozone, the role of ﬁscal policy as a tool
for economic stabilisation will become particularly important. The ﬁscal policy will be
aimed not only at reducing cyclical ﬂuctuations, but also synchronising business cycles
in Poland and the euro area.
In this paper we empirically compare two objectives of ﬁscal rule: minimising the
output in Poland and synchronisation of business cycles in Poland and the euro area.
Results show that ﬁscal policy focused only on the synchronisation of the business
cycles would lead to signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations of the structural budget balance. Fiscal pol-
icy aimed only at minimising the output gap in Poland would involve even larger
changes in the levels of restrictiveness of ﬁscal policy. In our analysis we observe the
smallest changes in the budget balance when the ﬁscal policy is aimed at both eliminat-
ing economic ﬂuctuations and increasing the level of business cycles synchronisation.
The ﬁscal rule that makes the level of the structural balance conditional on the
degree of business cycle synchronisation seems to be a reasonable solution for Poland
in the case of its future full participation in the Economic and Monetary Union. Then,
the policy of the European Central Bank should be aimed at reducing the output gap
across the whole union, while the ﬁscal policy of an individual country should be aimed
at neutralising asymmetric shocks. However, the analysis of the characteristics of the ﬁs-
cal rule has shown that the possibility of its practical application is rather limited. The
main reasons for these limitations are the lack of transparency of this rule and problems
with obtaining the newest macroeconomic data, which is connected with the data
publishing agenda.
Notes
1. Poland, despite not being a member of Eurozone yet, has signed Fiscal Compact.
2. To ﬁnd more on the interaction between ﬁscal policy and economic ﬂuctuations see for
example. Belullo and Dužman (2011), Gnip (2011).
3. It should be noted that individual public revenue and expenditure may differently affect the
level of GDP (see for example Baxter & King, 1993; Brunila, Buti, & in’t Veld, 2002).
4. For more on the impact of decomposition of the deﬁcit on the structural and cyclical compo-
nent see Giorno, Richardson, Rosevear, and van den Noord (1995) and Krajewski (2004).
5. For β ≠ 0.
6. That is estimates of parameters β, ϖB,Y.
7. The tax base of indirect taxes consists of private and public consumption. Only private
consumption is sensitive to output.
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8. The growth rate of employment is a non-stationary variable for Polish data, so the ﬁrst
differences were used in this case.
9. T-student statistics are shown in brackets.
10. Estimates of ﬁscal multipliers are even higher for the times of crisis (see Auerbach &
Gorodnichenko, 2012; Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2011).
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